Event Review 2.0: The Systems Approach

Rollin J. (Terry) Fairbanks, MD, MS
Director, National Center for Human Factors Engineering in Healthcare
Director, Simulation & Training Environment Laboratory (SiTEL)
MedStar Health, Washington DC, USA
www.MedicalHumanFactors.net; @TerryFairbanks
Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine, Georgetown University
Attending Emergency Physician, MedStar Washington Hospital Center

The rest of Annie’s story: The RCA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeldVu-3DpM

Glucometer Case...

• Patient with hx of poorly-controlled BG levels
  – Admitted to diabetic unit at hospital
  – Pt appears normal or hyperglycemic
• Accucheck indicates critically low BG
  – Misinterpreted by tech and RN as critical high
• Pt given repeated doses of insulin
  – Altered, rapid response called
  – Receives D50, Glucagon, & D10 drip
• Stays in ICU for 3 days: MAJOR EVENT
Nurse SUSPENDED

One week later... Repeated Incident

- Same scenario, different unity
- Multiple RNs, NP involved
- All misinterpreted critical LO as critical HI

Did disciplinary response make us safer?

The ‘Second Story’

- Patient has multiple signs of normal-high BG
  - Initial ED values = hyperglycemia
  - “I know my sugars, and I’m not low”
  - Ate all meals, snacks
- There was an ongoing failure to revise
  - Due to fixation effect and expectations
  - Glucometer design plays into this failure to revise
  - Actions taken initially have no effect
- ‘Fresh’ personnel discover true problem
“Critical Low” 0.1% (119/80,000)

How could you miss it?
video

Procurement: Who determines wording?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>Text of 'Out of Reportable Range' message popup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Critical value; Repeat; Lab Draw for &gt; 600.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>RR Lo = result &lt;40; RR Hi = result &gt;600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Out of range: repeat test to confirm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Critical value; repeat within 15 mins; notification required; lab draw for &gt;600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Critical value; you must repeat immediately; STAT glucose Lab draw for RR Hi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Repeat test</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We See...
What We Expect To See

Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, ths itaht the frist and lsat ltteer be at the rght pclae. Ths sstet cn be a toatl mses nd yu cn stll raed rt welh a porblem. Ths is bcuseae the huamn mnid deos not raed ervey ltteer by istrict, but th wrod s a wlohe.
AHRQ Culture Survey: Relevant Questions

“Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them”

“When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem”

“Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file”

“Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening”

State of the State

Event

(2-4 weeks later)

Root Cause Analysis (RCA) team meets

-Determine “Root Causes”
-Assign a solutions to each
-Assign person responsible

1. Send Report to DOH & board
2. F/U 6 weeks to ensure compliance
3. Close case, satisfied

Limitations of RCA

• Risk of premature conclusion
• Hindsight bias
• Lack of strong leadership and funds
• Failure to follow up
• Name-blame-train-shame
• Wrong contributing factors
• Ineffective solutions
• Non-sustainable solutions
• Failure to care for the caregiver
• Missed opportunities to involve patient & family
Reducing Risk:
Where should we focus?

- Focus on hazards and unsafe conditions
- Focus on near misses
- Address contributing factors that can be changed
- Use a TRUE non-punitive safety system
- Employ EFFECTIVE and SUSTAINABLE solutions

Develop Sustainable Solutions

Develop Effective Solutions

Consider Solutions in Context
(work as performed)

Focus on HAZARDS, proactive safety

Complex Adaptive Systems

WORK AS IMAGINED
How managers believe work is being done (rules)

GAP

WORK AS PERFORMED
Every-day work: How work IS being done

Adapted from: Ivan Pupulidy
“the conference organizer wants to explore why certain kinds of adverse events recur, despite developing policies implemented to quell them”

Why folks “don’t meet expectations”

- Not aware of expectation
- Aware but don’t agree
- Aware and agree, but ambiguity in expectation
- Aware and agree and unambiguous, but they don’t have the ability to do it

Ref: Goeschel, Gurses, Lubanski

Associates need avenues for feedback when they don’t understand or if expectations aren’t feasible in their context

Why folks “don’t meet expectations”

The design of the...
  System
  Device
  IT system
  Process
  Etc...
Facilitates normal error
The Healthcare Safety Problem...

is not bad people

Good, well trained, well intentioned
Remedial
Reckless

Healthcare: Complex adaptive system

Unordered:
Cannot predict cause & effect &
Cannot be modeled or forecasted

Ordered & Constrained &
Can be reduced to a set of rules

"Adaptive" in that their individual and collective behavior changes as a result of experience

2. Snowden D, cognitive‐edge.com

Resilience Engineering

Safety I: Why did they give the wrong vial?

Safety II: Why did they give the right vial all the other times?
Hindsight Bias: “Wire Case”

Cognitive Tasks

Basketball Video Instructions:
• Follow white shirts carefully
• Count passes
  – (excluding bounces)
Cognitive Tasks

- Inattentional Blindness
- Task Fixation
- Satisfaction of Search
- Our Current Solution: "don’t let go of the wire..."
- "Always check the whole XR"
- Will we achieve high reliability?
- System Solutions?
  - Computer aided diagnosis?
  - Seldinger design?
  - Shared cognition

Our Current Solution:
“don’t let go of the wire...”

- Email from former medical student, regarding intern orientation:
  “We had a central line session today and I was thinking about how you said it’s really impossible to never let go of the wire even though that’s what they teach. In the teaching video she let go of the wire 4 times.”

RCA Hierarchy

Hierarchy of Solutions

*IFF changes feasible in context of work*

1. Environmental & Design Changes
2. Forcing functions and constraints
3. Automation and computerization
4. Protocols, standards, information, alarm
5. Independent verification/redundancy
6. Rules and policies
7. Education, training, instruction

Key Points

• Normal work, not adverse events, should be our focus of learning
  – “I could have told you that would happen”

What DOES NOT reduce risk

• Concluding after an adverse event/RCA:
  – “Failure to follow policy” (or procedure) as primary root cause
  – “Develop policy” or “train staff” or “counsel” as primary action
  – “Human Error” as a cause without contributing factors
  – Any flavor of the “name, blame, and train” approach
“Skills-Based Error” = Slips and Lapses = “Automaticity” Errors

Figure adapted from: Understanding Human Behaviour and Error, Human Reliability Associates
Based on Rasmussen’s SRK model of cognitive control, adapted with thanks for Figure 3.20, 2008

3 things leaders can do tomorrow
1. Shift resources to 1° and 2° prevention
2. Implement Just Culture and start the change
   – Senior Leaders to frontline workers
3. Formally implement an event review process based on safety science
   It will change the culture!
   – NPSF’s new “RCA squared” (npsf.org)
   – AHRQ’s new “CANDOR” (Fall 2015 release)
AHRQ's CANDOR Tools: 2016

- Transparency and disclosure
- Care for the caregiver
- Improved hazard reporting
- Event review 2.0

Desired Outcomes of the Review Process

- Support of Caregiver: Frontline safety champions
- Support of Patient: Improves trust and reduces long term liability costs
- Identification and Learning: Mitigate future events
- Solutions: Mitigate future events
- Impact on Safety Culture: Go team has a profound impact on the perception of frontline employees
Event Review 2.0

Immediate Crisis Response
- Inform system leadership
- Care for patient and family
- Care for caregiver
- Gather time sensitive info

In Depth Event Review
- Interviews
- Understanding the context
- Identify causal factors
- Identify core team

Confirmation & Consensus Meeting
- Templates, project management techniques and documentation

Solutions Meeting

Follow Up

Thinking differently...
- “Go Team”
- Protected Peer Review
- 2 Meeting Structure
- Majority of work done before first meeting
- Expedited timeline for major events
- Updated Language

Insanity

“Continuing to do the same thing and expecting different results.”

--Einstein
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MedStar Institute for Innovation, MedStar Health / Washington DC USA
Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine, Georgetown University
Attending Emergency Physician, MedStar Washington Hospital Center

www.MedicalHumanFactors.net
www.SiTEL.org
Fairbanks.au@MedicalHFE.org (until 8/20/15)
Terry.Fairbanks@MedicalHFE.org
Twitter: @TerryFairbanks